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Abstract 
This paper analyses the effect of railway investment on land prices and land use in a polycentric city under 
various regulatory regimes of land markets. The introduction of a faster mode of transport (train), 
accessible in discrete locations leads to an extended city size. The stations of the “fast” mode attract dense 
residential settlements. As a result, the average residential and commercial land rents increase in both the 
competitive and segmented land market situations, as compared with the “slow” unimodal transport case. 
When rail investments only serve one particular centre, this leads to the growth of the advantaged centre at 
the expense of the other centre. Generally speaking, investment in the fast mode results in city growth and 
increase in rent receipts. However the effect of the investment for individual centres and their 
corresponding residential areas depends on the underlying land market assumptions and the level of 
investment. Distorted land markets lead to increases in commercial rents, but this is more than off-set by 
the decrease in residential land rent. 
   
Key words: 
Bimodal urban model, bicentric city, commercial land rent, residential land rent, railway 
station, railway development. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The car has gradually become the dominant transport mode in most cities of developed countries. 
However, there still are cities, such as London, Paris and New York, where a large part of the 
workers use public transport. Therefore, to make a proper analysis of land and labour markets in 
such cities, both transport modes should be considered. Many cities started with a clear 
monocentric structure. During the course of time, however, a gradual deconcentration process 
took place, leading to a decreasing dominance of the original centre. But, in some cases, edge 
cities have developed, implying the emergence of additional centres of commercial activity in a 
metropolitan area (Garreau, 1988). In other cases, the gradual growth of small- and medium-sized 
cities led to the evolution of large metropolitan areas consisting of overlapping urban areas that 
were formerly independent. In both these cases of city evolution, the original monocentric urban 
model no more applies. This paper sets out to study both phenomena in an urban model which 
deal with the combination of multiple transport modes and multiple centres of economic activity. 
In the urban modelling, in relation to the type of centre and mode of transport assumptions, we 
can logically distinguish four categories: monocentric-unimodal transport; monocentric-
multimodal transport; polycentric-unimodal transport; and polycentric-multimodal transport. 
Most of the literature is in line with the first category, although recently, more and more studies 
that make the polycentric assumption have appeared. But these are still dominated by the 
unimodal transport assumption. In the contrary, this paper can be characterized as a study in the 
last of the four above mentioned category. We deal with an urban model of multiple centres and 
multiple transport modes. This can be considered as an extension to the literature, since we deal 
with two modes of transport in the model. The additional mode of transport addressed here 
(railway) is more in line with public transport. It operates from discrete locations that are 
represented by stations. Accordingly, we will use the terms “fast mode” and “train” 
interchangeably. The goal of this paper is to develop an urban model with an emphasis on the 
impact of investment in transportation on the real estate market. Thus, this paper assesses the 
effect of investment on rail in the spatial rent structure. Moreover, this will help us to assess the 
effects of an additional transport system (rail) on urban grow the in general, and the growth of 
particular sub-centres. In addition, this paper assesses the effect of partial railway investment on 
the competitive position between centres within the city. Previously, Sasaki (1989) has addressed 
the effect of change in a competing bimodal transport system on the monocentric urban structure. 
The transport modes differ in cost structure. He concluded that the effect of change in transport 
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modes is not as unambiguous as it used to be in with the unimodal case. The basic difference 
between Sasaki’s and our approach in dealing the bimodal case pertains to the operation of the 
modes. In Sasaki’s approach, apart from the cost structure, there is no distinction in the operation 
of the modes, i.e. they operate in a continuous line space. However, in addition to the difference 
in cost structure we impose additional distinguishing factor in that the ‘slow’ mode operates in 
continuous line space whereas the ‘fast’ mode operates from discrete locations represented by 
stations.  Here we extend Sivitanidou and Wheaton’s (1992) model by introducing an additional 
mode of transport (rail: fast mode with discrete access points) running through the bicentric linear 
open city. In the model, households and firms interact via the exchange of labour and wages. The 
differences between our model and that of Sivitanidou and Wheaton (1992) concern aspects such 
as: the introduction of a second transport mode; endogenous land consumption by households; 
endogenous density of settlements; and endogenous wages for the two centres.  
In subsequent sections we briefly discuss the literature in the area (section 2), discuss the 
specification of our model (Section 3), and give the equilibrium conditions of the model (Section 
4). We then introduce the model for alterative land markets: competitive and segmented (Section 
5). The model simulation and results are discussed in Section 6. Finally, we conclude and suggest 
a direction for future research (Section 7).  
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The relation between land values and proximity of land to employment centres has been 
addressed extensively in the literature. The monocentric circular city has received the most 
attention. However, in many parts of the world, especially in Western Europe, Japan and the U.S., 
metropolitan areas are increasingly assuming polycentric structures. The Randstad Holland, 
Rhine-Ruhr metropolitan area in Germany, the Flemish Diamond in Belgium, the Glasgow-
Edinburgh region in UK, the Padua-Treviso-Venice region in Italy, Southern California in the 
U.S. and the Kansai area in Japan are probably the most frequently mentioned polycentric 
structures (van der Wusten and Faludi, 1992; Dieleman and Faludi, 1998; Batten, 1995; Musterd 
and van Zelm, 2001). But, even though polycentric urbanization started earlier in Europe than in 
the U.S., its pace was slowed in Europe as a result of conservative urban policies. 
A common conjecture in the literature is that transportation is believed to be the prime factor in 
shaping the urban structure (Clark and Kuijpers-Linde, 1994). However, the equilibrium location 
of businesses and households has always been an outcome of the trade-off between production 
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economies and transport diseconomies (direct and congestion costs). The transportation side 
favours dispersed business locations, whereas the production side favours compact business 
locations. Thus, besides changes on the transportation side, changes on the production side 
(agglomeration and productivity effects) are also responsible for determining the equilibrium 
location and thus shaping the urban location (Glaeser and Kahn, 2003). Fujita et al. (1999) tried 
to theoretically explain the effects of agglomeration on the optimal location of firms in relation to 
a location of historic centre. In a linear city of unit length, the optimal location of a new plant will 
be in the historic centre for a wide range of locations. Nevertheless, at times, the optimal location 
of the plant can be different from the historic centre. The trade-off between agglomeration effects 
and transportation costs explains the coexistence of multiple centres in a city.  In a recent paper, 
Modarres (2003) found for Los Angeles County that sub-centres contain one-third of the county’s 
employment. However, the transit network structure appears to serve these sub-centres 
inadequately. This shows that the formation of a polycentric urban structure was not in response 
to the development of public transit in the first place. On the contrary, the increasing use of 
private cars is believed to be instrumental in shaping the present dispersed urban structure 
(Glaeser and Kahn, 2003). In addition to the use of cars, Sivitanidou (1997) showed that the 
recent information revolution is also contributing towards the weakening of spatial links between 
commercial activities and large business locations, thereby leading to increasingly dispersed 
business locations.  
Even though polycentricity simply implies the presence of multiple centres in an urban area, there 
is no proper identification procedure (Anas et al., 1996). For practical purposes, areas can be 
treated as centres as far as they significantly affect such variables as employment density, 
population residential density, property values and travel patterns. Several authors have tried to 
propose ways of identifying centres in cities by both parametric and non-parametric methods. 
However, these still remain essentially subjective. The main methods of these types are: the 
residual method of McDonald (1989); the employment density cutoffs method of Giuliano and 
Small (1991); and the employment smoothing estimation procedure of Craig and Ng (2001). 
Later, McMillen (2001) developed a two-stage centre identification procedure, which 
incorporates concepts of McDonald, and Craig and Ng. In the first stage, candidate centres are 
identified through the analysis of the residuals of a smoothed employment density function. The 
second stage assesses the significance of the identified centres in influencing local employment 
densities. This reflects the definition that centres are sites which result in a significant rise in 
employment densities after controlling for the historic centre (the CBD). Apart from calculating 
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an employment density indicator, Musterd and van Zelm (2001) discussed various ways to define 
a polycentric city structure. Both spatial structure and the existence of intricate network-type 
interactions should be present before considering an urban area to be a polycentric unit. They 
argue that at the household level, polycentric regions the size of the Randstad and the Rhine-Ruhr 
are too big to constitute a relevant geographical region. However, in another study of the 
Randstad, Schwanen et al. (2001) found that the level of urban land deconcentration alters a 
household’s modal choice from public transport to private modes.  
Several studies have addressed the effect of urban spatial structure on property values. This will 
also be the main focus of this paper, which attempts to answer the question: How does the 
polycentricity of an urban area shape the land rent structure? The value of a centre is capitalized 
in the form of land rents. In addition to the predetermined centre in the urban models, other 
studies, without explicitly referring to the centre(s), have concluded that the rent gradient peaks 
around the most valuable location in the urban spatial structure. Indirectly, these peaks are also 
used to identify the centre(s) of the city. However, in this sense, the monocentric assumption is in 
reality a very simplistic assumption. Therefore, over the years, attempts have been made to 
develop urban models in the context of polycentric situations (pre-specified and non-pre-specified 
locations).  
A comprehensive general equilibrium polycentric urban model was developed by Anas and Kim 
(1996). Without scale economies of shopping, production is dispersed in the city with rent, wage, 
and commodity price and density gradients peaking in the centre of the space. One of the models 
on property values in a bicentric city was developed by Sivitanidou and Wheaton (1992). Special 
attention was given to the centres’ production cost difference and commercial land market 
regulation. The main finding of the paper was that cost advantages are capitalized in commercial 
land rent and wages (and wages in their turn, in residential land rents). The level of capitalization 
of production cost advantages in commercial land rent becomes higher in the regulated 
commercial land market compared with the competitive market. This throws doubt on the 
application of the hedonic pricing theory to commercial and residential land rents in the context 
of distorted markets. Therefore, in the present paper we will pay special attention to market 
distortions. 
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3. THE STRUCTURE OF THE MODEL 
3.1 Bicentric-Bimodal urban structure: model description 
In this section, we introduce the equilibrium land use model of an urban area that we discuss in 
this paper. The city in our model has two area occupying centres, b miles apart from each centre’s 
edge. They both function as employment and production centres. Land use in these centres is 
explicitly modelled. Labour is employed from households living in the residential areas of the 
city. Each household is assumed to have one member. All households arriving at either of the two 
centres deliver identical labour. Thus, labour for production is measured in terms of household 
numbers. The inputs in the production process constitute labour and commercial floor space. In 
the production process of the centres, we assume a fixed ratio between labour and floor space. 
Floor space is prepared in a cost-minimizing fashion from land rented at the commercial land rent 
rate and capital rented at some market rent of capital. The output follows a constant returns to 
scale technology, and is exported at a given price in a fully competitive market.  
The households have a well-behaved utility function. Residential land and non-land consumption 
goods make up the utility-bearing bundle. By travelling to one of the employment centres, 
households acquire an endogenously given wage. The residential land rent has a bid nature. The 
price of non-land consumption goods is taken as a numéraire (unity). In our analysis, no other 
income sources are considered, apart from the wages. Thus, the household’s budget is constrained 
by wage earnings. All commercial and residential rents are absorbed by absentee land owners. 
This is one of the elements that make our model a partial equilibrium model. 
Two modes of transport operate in the open city: a “slow” mode (car) that is accessible from 
anywhere in the city, and a “fast” mode (train) accessible from certain fixed stations. The 
distinction between the “slow” and “fast” modes does not only relate to the time cost of 
transportation, but rather to the generalized transportation cost structure. The fast mode results in 
some sort of cost saving, and is thus termed “fast”. In our linear city model, as well as at the 
centres, we assume three additional stations at a distance of b/2 miles from the edges of the 
centres (see Figure 1 below). To make the bimodal transport approach relevant to our analysis, 
we assume that the per distance cost of transportation for the fast mode (train) is lower than that 
of the slow mode. Transportation inside the centres is assumed to be zero. Thus, only 
transportation costs incurred by the households to reach the edge of the centres are considered. 
Transportation by households takes place from their residences to the nearest edge of the 
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employment centre. Households make use of the transport modes in a way that minimizes 
generalized transportation costs. 
We further assume that the city we deal here with is open: workers are free to migrate into or out 
of the city. The households enjoy the national utility level u which is bounded from below by the 
supreme utility level (a level of utility that guarantees the existence of the city). Thus, all 
households in the city enjoy a given utility level that is equivalent to the level of utility enjoyed 
by the households outside the city in the economy.  
The exogenous parameters of the model can be seen from three sides: namely, the household side; 
the producer side; and the spatial structure of the city. On the consumer side, we have: national 
utility level; price of non-land consumption goods; and transportation costs of the modes. On the 
producer side we have: cost advantage of one centre over the other; floor space requirement per 
worker; and cost of capital. Lastly, for the spatial structure of the city we have: width of the city 
and the distance between the nodes, given exogenously to the model. The value of the exogenous 
variables used in the simulation is given in Table 1. Analysis is provided for two regulatory 
alternatives for land market situations: competitive and segmented markets.  
3.2 Notation and definition of variables 
The utility functions of the households follow a Cobb Douglas formulation. Centre 1 is assumed 
as a reference (located at 0) for all nodes. Centre 2 is at a location b distance units away from the 
edge of centre 1.  Here, we do not try to find out the optimal distance separating the centres. We 
take this distance as exogenous to our model and analyse its implication for the land market 
coupled with transportation investment. The general layout of the city structure is depicted in 
Figure 1. The two centres occupy a significant land for commercial purposed in the urban area. 
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* The location of the railway stations in the linear city 
Figure 1: Layout of linear city with two commercial centres, each with its own railway stations 
and three additional railway stations 
In Figure 1, the first row gives the variable representing the location of some critical points in the 
linear city: namely, the fringes of the city, the edges of the centres and the station locations. The 
left edge of centre 1 is taken as the origin of the linear city. L1 and L2 represent the size of the two 
centres, respectively. According to the land market assumptions, they can be given exogenous to 
the model or are endogenously determined in the model.  This is dealt with in detail in the next 
section. 
Node 
Location 
****
Centre 1 Centre 2
-b/2 L1+b
1 
0 L1+L2+3b/2 L1+b/2 
2 3 4 5 
L1 L1+ L2+b 
* *
Variable f- r1 r2- r2+ r3 r4- r4+ r5 f+
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Table 1: Model variables 
Variable Description 
I   The set of employment and production centres I ={ }1, 2   
J   The set of transport nodes =J { }5,..2,1 , where I J⊆   
r   A variable location in one dimensional space  
jr   Location of node j , Jj∈  
u   Utility level 
iw   Wage at centre i , Ii∈   
*
jY  Artificial income at node j , Jj∈   
RA  Rent for agricultural land (the basic land rent) 
iRC  Commercial land rent at centre i , Ii∈  
cr  Rent of capital ($/sq. ft.) 
RFi   Rent for floor space at centre i , Ii∈   
),( urjΨ   Residential bid rent per unit lot size of land corresponding to node Jj∈ , at location r, and u level of utility.  
RR(r,u)  Prevailing residential rent per unit lot size of land at location r for utility level u.  
S(r,u)   Size of residential land consumed by household at location r, the max bid lot size  
Z(r,u)    Amount of goods (produced at the centres) consumed at location r. We take these goods as a numéraire with 
unit price.  
sk   Transportation cost per unit distance for the slow mode  
fk    Transportation cost per unit distance for the fast mode  
)(rT  Transportation cost function from location r to the destination centre (node) 
Ni    Number of employees at centre i , Ii∈  
Qsi   Floor space at centre i , Ii∈  
Li  Area of commercial land at centre i . 
Ki    Amount of capital employed at centre i , Ii∈  
as   Floor space per workers ratio (Qsi/Ni), Ii∈  
CA   Production cost advantage for centre 1.  
prt   Productivity per worker (units/worker). 
),( url    Distribution of land in the city. In the linear constant unit width city, it is uniform, given by ),( url  = 1. 
(r,u)   Density of households of a city at location r, corresponding to u level of utility. 
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4. EQUILIBRIUM CONDITIONS 
4.1 Households’ equilibrium: utility maximization 
Besides to the agricultural land use that starts at the outermost fringes of the city, urban land is 
devoted to residential and commercial use. The assumption of a land market without any 
imperfections guarantees that the commercial land rent always outbids the residential land rent in 
the employment centres. To keep the analysis tractable, we assume transport cost within the 
centre to be zero, so that the commercial land rent is uniform within the centres. For residential 
land use, the trade-off between transport costs and other consumption opportunities leads to a 
downward-sloping bid rent curve from the edge of the centres. Figure 2 depicts the rent structure 
of a city with one centre. The segment oc, is devoted to commercial land use.   The segment cf, 
where the residential land rent dominates is the area of the city devoted to residential land use. To 
the right of f, transportation costs reach a level such that the residential rent falls below the 
agricultural land rent; therefore that area is devoted to agricultural land use. Thus, the land rent 
curve is an envelope of the curves, as depicted by the figure below.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2 Land use and land rent curve 
The centres are job centres where the individuals earn wages by offering labour. Commuting to 
the centres is possible by one of the slow or fast mode, or a combination of both these modes. The 
transportation costs corresponding to the modes of transport represent a generalized cost 
structure. Thus, comparison between the two modes can follow smoothly. The individuals use the 
fast and/or slow transport mode in total transportation cost-minimizing fashion in order to reach 
the centre, where they can earn higher net income (wages minus transport costs). Due to their 
cost-saving nature, the nodes of transport can function as additional centres that have a 
corresponding land rent curves. They invite dense residential settlement, if not employment. 
Apart from the intersection points of the rent curves, at any particular place along the length of 
   f o   c 
Agr Res 
Rent 
RA
RC
RR
Com
 11
the linear city, one rent curve will always outbid the others. Thus, the real land rent curve in the 
city is the envelope of the various land rent curves corresponding to the different nodes. 
Below, we give the derivation of a general case residential bid rent function. It is defined by the 
maximum rent per unit land that a household, at a location r, which travels to a specified 
employment centre to get an income Y, can pay while achieving a certain utility level u . The bid 
rent function in the city is a function of the distance and the utility level enjoyed by the 
households (Fujita, 1989), which can be written as: 



 =−−=Ψ uszU
s
zrTYur sz ),(|
)(max),( ,  ,            (1) 
where ),( urΨ is the residential land rent, for a household at location r enjoying a given 
exogenous level of utility u . ),( szU  is the utility function, where z is the composite 
consumption good of the household that has a unit price, and s is the land lot size per household. 
The household incurs transportation costs T(r) which is a function of the location r in relation to 
the location of the employment centre, and receives Y level of income. 
Equation (1) can be rewritten by expressing the amount of composite consumption goods of the 
household in terms of lot size of land and utility: 



 −−=Ψ
s
usZrTYur s
),()(max),(  .             (2) 
For a fixed utility levelu , the FOC for maximizing the right hand side of equation (2) occurs at 
the point where the marginal change of the function with respect to s is zero. This leads to the 
relation: 
s
usZrTY
s
usZ ),()(),( −−=∂
∂− .              (3) 
At the optimal choice of s the right hand side of (3) equals the bid rent ),( urΨ :  
),(),( ur
s
usZ Ψ=∂
∂− . 
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For simplicity and ease of derivation, we assume that the utility function of the household has the 
following functional form: 
( , ) ln ln 1U z s z sα β α β= + + = .                               (4) 
The equation of the indifference curve is given as ααβ //),( uesusZ −= . Solving the maximization 
problem in (2) using the condition in (3), we have: 
βββα βα //1/ ))((),( uerTYur −−=Ψ ;              (5) 
ββαβααβ /// ))((),(/))((),( uerTYurrTYurS −− −=Ψ−= .                  (6) 
Artificial income at nodes 
In order to relate the general bid rent analysis to our bimodal multi-nodal model, we introduce a 
special income variable. Households travel to the employment centre that maximizes their net 
income. Thus, they can use the slow mode of transport to directly reach the employment centre of 
choice or a station, and then use the fast mode of transport to reach the employment centre. The 
multiple nodes situation in our case implies that these nodes can be described as centres.  Some of 
these centres are real production and employment centres, and some are artificial centres with 
zero production. Thus, an income variable can be attached to each of these centres which we term 
“artificial income” ( *jY ), defined as in equation (7) below. This income is net of income at the 
appropriate centre minus the transportation costs by the fast mode from the node to this centre. As 
there are five nodes (including the centre) in our model, *2Y  ( 1w≥ ) and *4Y  ( 2w≥ ) represent the 
artificial income at centre 1 and centre 2, respectively. The equality of these incomes with the real 
wages offered at the corresponding centres represents the coexistence of the centres as both 
production and employment centres. However, when one of the artificial incomes is higher than 
the real wages offered at the corresponding centre, this implies that the centre ceases to be a 
production centre. This means that this centre is dominated by the other centre: it serves as a 
transfer node to the dominant node. Households find commuting to the dominant centre 
profitable, making it the sole production centre. The introduction of the artificial income here 
helps to reduce the whole analysis of the model to a one-transport case, by eliminating the second 
mode of transport at this level, and thus we have: 
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IiandJjrTwY jifiij ∈∈−= )((max* ,   (7) 
where ( )f jiT r represents the transportation costs from node j  to centre i  by the fast mode. In the 
simple linear cost function ( )f jiT r = || ||f i jk r r× − . For the rest of our analysis, we adopt this 
linear transport cost function. 
(a) Residential land rent: 
Once the edge of the node is determined, residential areas face a downward-sloping rent curve 
with distance. Thus, we observe both distances: distance from the centre, and distance from the 
station, determining the land rent. In addition to the distance effect, the importance of the centres 
as explained by the level of wages paid at the centres, also determines the rent of residential land. 
Due to the bidding nature of rent, the prevailing land rent at any location is the maximum of the 
rent curves corresponding to each of the transport nodes in the linear city. The bid rent, max bid 
lot size, and density functions corresponding to each of the nodes are given by: 
βββα βα //1*/ )(),( ujsjj errkYur −−−=Ψ ;  (8) 
),(/)(),( * urrrkYurS jjsjj Ψ−−= β ;  (9) 
( , ) 1/ ( , )j jr u S r uρ = .  (10) 
The residential bid rent, residential lot size, and settlement densities are not defined within the 
centres. In the centres, commercial rents always exceed residential rents. The prevailing values in 
the city are the maximum or minimum envelopes of the above variables corresponding to the 
nodes. 
 }5,...,2,1{)),((max),( ∈Ψ= jururRR jj ;           (11) 
}5,...,2,1{)),((min),( ∈= jurSurS jj ;  (12) 
}5,...2,1{)),((max),( ∈= jurur jj ρρ .  (13) 
(b) Commercial land rent 
In the production process of the firm(s) operating at the employment centre, land is one of the 
inputs in the production of floor space. Because transportation costs inside the centre are assumed 
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to be zero, a uniform land rent for commercial use is obtained. The nature of the commercial land 
rent in the centres is determined by the nature of the land market. In a competitive market 
situation, the commercial land rents are equal to the corresponding residential land rents at the 
edges of the centres. However, when the land market is regulated in some different ways, a 
different result may be obtained. We will give more attention to the effect of the nature of the 
land market in the analysis of land rent in the following sections.  
(c) Prevailing land rent and land use 
In the model we distinguish three types of land use: commercial; residential; and agriculture. The 
agricultural land rent is given exogenous to the model. This uniform commercial land rent bids 
out the downward-sloping residential rent curve which start at the edge of the centre. Thus, the 
prevailing rent curve at any point in space is the maximum of the residential, commercial and 
agriculture land rents, which can be written as:  
),),,((max)( , RARCurrR ijJjIi Ψ= ∈∈ .  (14) 
4.2 Producers’ equilibrium: cost minimization  
At the production side, the model incorporates the assumption of Sivitanidou and Wheaton 
(1992), in which the two centres make products that utilize labour and floor space and that are 
sold outside city. Floor space at the centres (Qsi) is produced by making use of capital (Ki) and 
land (Li) with constant returns to scale Cobb Douglas production function, as given below:  
δδ −= 1LKQsi .  (15) 
Centres are assumed to have constant floor space demand per worker ( is
i
Qsa
N
= ). Thus, given the 
price of capital ( cr ), rent for floor space is given by: 
i i c i
i
s i
RC L r KRF
a N
+= ,    Ii∈ .   (16) 
The cost minimizing input bundle is given by: 
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)1()
)1(
( δδ
δ −
−= c
i
isi r
RCNaK ,    Ii∈ ;  (17) 
δ
δ
δ
)
)1(
(
i
c
isi RC
rNaL −= ,        Ii∈ .  (18) 
Therefore, the long-run cost-minimizing floor space rent is: 
)1()1()1( δδδδ δδ −−− −= ici RCrRF ,     Ii∈ .  (19) 
The production equilibrium condition between the centres thus states that the costs per worker at 
each of the centres should be equal. The element of cost advantage here can be regarded as 
internal cost savings in the production process, or otherwise as external subsidy: 
1 2 2 1s sw w RF a RF a CA− = − + .  (20) 
Centres operate at a zero profit. They are price takers for the goods or services supplied on the 
national market: 
011 =×−−+ saRFwCAprt ;             (21) 
022 =×−− saRFwprt .                                                                                                          (22) 
4.3 Indifference location 
The number of households in the city ( N ) is an important element in the determination of the 
equilibrium conditions. It is assumed that the city does not continue beyond the fringes of the 
residential areas. The total number of households in the city is calculated as the integral of 
household density between the city fringes. The left ( −f ) and right ( +f ) fringes of the city are 
locations where the residential rent corresponding to the nearest node and the agricultural rent 
intersect, which can be written as:  
RAuf =Ψ − ),(1 ;              (23) 
RAuf =Ψ + ),(5 ;              (24) 
drurN
f
f∫
+
−= ),(ρ .                                                    (25) 
 16
But, in order to determine the number of households commuting to each of the centres, we need 
another critical location, i.e. is the indifference location between the centres. An important 
property of the introduction of a second mode in the linear city is that it opens the possibility of 
cross-commuting. This means that households residing in a range of locations will be left 
indifferent between commuting to any of the centres. In such a situation, the expected number of 
households commuting to the centres will be distributed equally, leaving the indifference point 
necessary for the analysis still effective. This assumption constrains the asymmetric cross 
commuting case. Our analysis will be limited to symmetric cross-commuting, in cases of wider 
indifference locations. The rent curve corresponding to the middle station in our model certainly 
plays a part in determining the indifference location. However, to which side of the station this 
point lays is affected by a wide range of factors, of which, in this model, we will be limited to the 
cost advantage (CA) of the centres in their production process. Thus, the indifference location (f) 
can be given by: 
.0),(),(
0
0),(),(
23
3
43
<Ψ=Ψ
==
>Ψ=Ψ
CAifufuf
CAifrf
CAifufuf
 .           (26) 
Given that (f) is the indifference location between the centres, the number of households working 
in each centre is given by: 
1 ( , )
f
f
N r u drρ−= ∫ ;               (27) 
2 ( , )
f
f
N r u drρ+= ∫ .  (28) 
5. ALTERNATIVE LAND MARKETS 
5.1 Competitive land market: 
In this model we assume households and firms freely bid against each other for land. At the edges 
of the centres the commercial and residential rents are equal. The competitive land bidding 
ensures that landlords will eventually extract the maximum saving that the consumers may enjoy, 
given the utility level. Because, by assumption, there are no transportation costs inside centres, 
the commercial rent curve assumes a uniform pattern.  Centres situated at pre-specified locations 
make no profit from production processes. The equilibrium condition for the competitive market 
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contains 13 equations in 13 unknowns. The equilibrium conditions for the competitive land 
market are presented below in Table 2. 
Table 2: Equilibrium conditions 
Description Equation Previous reference 
Equality of residential bid rent and commercial 
rent at the edges of employment centres 
 
12222 ),(),( RCurur =Ψ=Ψ +− , 
24444
),(),( RCurur =Ψ=Ψ +−  
 
- 
Cost-minimizing floor space function at the 
centres  
)1(
1
)1(
1 )1(
ββββ ββ −−− −= RCrRF c  
)1(
2
)1(
2 )1(
ββββ ββ −−− −= RCrRF c
 
 
(19), for Ii∈  
Zero profit condition for production centres 011 =×−−+× saRFwCApprt  
022 =×−−× saRFwpprt  
(21) 
 
(22) 
Commercial land for centres δ
δ
δ
)
)1(
(
1
11 RC
rNaL cs
−=  
δ
δ
δ
)
)1(
(
2
22 RC
rNaL cs
−=  
 
 
(18),  for Ii∈  
Number of households attending the centres 
1 ( , )
f
f
N r u drρ−= ∫  
2 ( , )
f
f
N r u drρ+= ∫  
(27) 
 
(28) 
Left and right fringes of the linear city RAuf =Ψ − ),(2  
RAuf =Ψ + ),(4  
(23) 
(24) 
Indifference location between the two centres 
0),(),(
0
0),(),(
23
3
43
<Ψ=Ψ
==
>Ψ=Ψ
CAifufuf
CAifrf
CAifufuf
 
 
(26) 
Note: The above 13 system of equilibrium conditions has 13 unknowns { 1RF , 2RF , 1w , 2w , 
1RC ,  2RC ,  f ,  
−f ,  +f , 1N , 2N ,  1L , 2L  }. 
5.2. A segmented land market 
In this second model, we impose a binding restriction on the commercial land area for one or both 
of the centres, such that iL = rl <
*
iL , where 
*
iL  is the land area occupied by centre i  if no 
restriction is imposed on it. This restriction affects the commercial land rent, and the relative cost 
of land versus capital. Thus, at the centre with the commercial area restriction, the land rent is no 
longer determined by competitive bidding from residential land rent, but is instead based on the 
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supply of commercial land rent. With a restricted supply of land, the commercial land rent 
increases, increasing the relative cost of land to capital in the centre. This results in input 
substitution of land for capital, thus increasing the capital to land ratio. 
 If the two centres are constrained for commercial land area, we see that the commercial land rent 
increases in both centres, leading to capital-intensive production. The investment in the fast 
transport mode increases the labour supply that can reach the centres. This labour increase, 
coupled with the constrained commercial land area, will further push up the commercial land rent. 
The shift in the relative cost of land to capital at the centres leads to capital-intensive production 
in the centres. An increase in the wage at the centres has the same effect. Leaving out the first two 
equations which are specially related to competitive market case from Table 2 above, the 
remaining 11 equations determine the equilibrium conditions for this model. The equilibrium 
condition in this market situation has 11 equations in 11 unknowns.  
6. MODEL SIMULATIONS, OUTPUT AND DISCUSSION 
On the basis of the model above, we now simulate the results of three transport mode situations 
for the two land market conditions. With respect to the transport mode, we have looked at the 
unimodal case and, two bimodal cases: namely, partial and full bimodal. In the partial bimodal 
case, only centre 1 is served by the fast mode from two stations b/2 miles away from its edges, in 
addition to the slow mode. On the other hand in the full bimodal case where feasible, both centres 
are served by the faster mode from the pre-specified stations, in addition to the slow mode. Apart 
from the nature of the land market, the cost advantage of the centres in their production process is 
taken as another distinguishing factor in the analysis. Below, we present the simulated rent curves 
for each of the cases. 
Exogenous parameters:  
As an extension of the model presented by Sivitanidou and Wheaton (1992), our model uses the 
same value for some of the exogenous parameters that they used in their simulation. The 
remaining variables that relate to the new extension to the model are selected in a way that 
facilitates comparison. The values are given in Table 3 below.  
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Table 3:  Value of exogenous parameters 
Parameter Value
Distance between nodes (b/2 mile) 10.00
Width of the city (mile) 1.00
β  in utility function 0.50
Agricultural rent ($/acre) 7500.00
Annual cost of transport 
- Slow mode sk  ($) 350.00
- Fast mode fk  ($) 200.00
δ  in floor space function 0.77
Floor space per worker sa (sq. ft.) 250.00
Annual rent of capital ($/sq. ft.) cr  7.00
National utility level u  1.20
Price of non-land consumption  1.00
Price of production output (p) 1.00
Productivity per worker prt  22371.00
Cost advantage (CA) for centre 1 ($) 0; 1,000
Commercial land restrictions 
- Centre 1 (sq. miles) 1.80
- Centre 2 (sq. miles) 1.80
The graphical and numerical presentations of the simulation output are given in Appendices I and 
II. The following section discusses the findings. The partial equilibrium model is used to analyse 
the impact of the three items: land market distortions; the cost advantage of centres; and 
investments in rail infrastructure.  
6.1 Effect of land market distortions 
The competitive land market makes it possible for the production centres to acquire the required 
amount of land input for their production process at the competitive land rent. As long as the 
wage-paying ability is not affected, the competitive land rent level remains the same. This leaves 
unchanged the relative cost of land and capital, and the capital to land ratio in the production 
technology of the centres. In contrast, in the segmented market, the level of land restriction (the 
supply of commercial land) imposed in the centre(s) affects the commercial land rent and 
residential land rent. The restriction has a direct effect on the relative cost of capital and land. 
This in turn affects the wage-paying ability of the centres. Therefore, segmentation of the market 
has an effect on the production technology of the centres. The higher the commercial land 
restriction imposed on the centres, the higher the relative price of land to capital. Centres will 
then be increasingly capital-intensive in their production process. This leads to higher commercial 
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land rents in the centres. In real life, this fact is visible in the form of high-rise buildings in central 
areas of cities. On the other hand, the commercial land restriction reduces the wage-paying ability 
of the centres. Thus, at each location, residential land rents will be lower than the corresponding 
locations under the competitive land market situation.  
As Table 1 shows, the occurrence of restrictions on commercial land in the centres leads to an 
increase in total commercial land receipts (.277 versus .273): the increase in rent per unit 
dominates the decrease in area. This seems to indicate that restrictions on commercial land use 
improve opportunities to use land rents as a source of finance for infrastructure. However, the 
increase in commercial land rents is more than off-set by a decrease in residential land rents 
(3.758 versus 3.786). 
6.2 Effect of cost advantage 
Next, we look at the effects of assumed differences in the production processes of the centres. 
Cost advantages in the production process are assumed here to account for this difference. An 
exogenous difference in the cost of production between the centres (CA) is capitalized into 
differences in commercial space and wages. However, the level of capitalization differs between 
the market situations considered. In the competitive market situation, wage capitalization 
accounts for most of the capitalization. But, in the segmented market case the difference in 
commercial rent of the advantaged centre accounts for an increasing proportion.  
6.3 Effect of transportation investment 
The main focus of this paper is to determine the effect of investment in a fast mode on the land 
market. To trace the effect of the transportation investment, we compare three cases: namely, 1) 
the base case (i.e. the unimodal case); 2) partial bimodal case, where only one centre is served by 
the fast mode from two stations; and 3) the complete bimodal case, where the two centres are 
served by the fast mode from three stations. Investment in the fast transport mode makes 
commuting to the centres possible from a wider range of locations. Hence, the city size is 
enlarged by claiming land from agricultural use outside the city. In addition, the fast mode 
stations attract denser residential settlement, which contributes to the population increase in the 
city. In general, the effect of the investment in fast transport has a different effect for the two 
land-market structures. In the competitive market, the investment does not affect the level of 
wage paying ability of the centres. However, the average residential land rents increase as a result 
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of an increase in the density of settlement around the stations (compare the unimodal and 
complete bimodal case in Tables AII1 and AII2 in Appendix II). On the other hand, because of 
the unchanged wage level, the commercial land rent is not affected. The capital to land ratio that 
represents the technology of the centres remains the same. However, the size of the centres 
increases due to the increase in the number of employees arriving at the centres. In the segmented 
market case, some effects occur on both the residential and commercial sides. The additional 
labour made possible by the fast mode has the same direction of effect on the residential and the 
commercial land rents in the city (as was discussed earlier in this paragraphs). The important 
feature here is that, due to the increase in the demand of commercial land (as a result of the 
increase in labour), coupled with the limited supply of land, the commercial land rent increases. 
This makes the non-labour input into the production process costly. At the break-even level, the 
wage-paying ability of the centres declines. As a result, the average residential land rent declines 
compared with the case of the competitive market (1.34 versus 1.36). 
We conclude from Table 1 that, under a distorted land market, total commercial rent increase in 
the city, as a result of the introduction of rail, is higher than in a competitive market (.302-.273 
versus .314-.277). However, total residential rents decrease substantially due to segmentation, and 
thus the net effect on total rent receipts is clearly less favourable under distorted land markets 
than under competitive land markets. Hence, if capturing rents as a means to finance 
infrastructure is feasible at all locations, the competitive market offers the best opportunities. But, 
if these opportunities are only possible at commercial locations, the conclusion may change.  
(a) Competitive position of centres 
The effect of partial investment in the faster transport mode on the relative competitive position 
of the centres can be seen by allowing only one centre to benefit from such service. We can see 
this effect from Tables AII.1 and AII.2 (in Appendix II) under the partial bimodal case.  In the 
simulation, we allow a partial fast mode transport investment to serve only centre 1. In general, 
the fast mode leads to the growth of city size and an increase in total rent in both market 
situations. However, it affects the average and total rent of the individual centres differently. In 
the competitive market, the investment leads to the decline of average and total residential land 
rent in the disadvantaged centre. In this case, even though the average commercial land rent is not 
affected, the total commercial land rent of the centre declines. In contrast, in the segmented 
market case, the effect of the investment leads to a decline for both average and total commercial 
and residential land rents. This shows that the advantaged centre grows at the expense of the 
 22
disadvantaged centre by claiming more of the households residing in the area between the 
centres. 
(b) Land rent loss or gain as a result of rail investment 
In the competitive land market, due to the flexible size of centres, the comparison of areas that 
lose or gain rent as a result of transport investment is difficult to trace graphically. However, a 
clearer comparison can be made in the segmented land market. We will focus on the residential 
land rent.  Residential land rent is directly affected by the wage-paying ability at the centres. As 
we go from the unimodal case to the partial bimodal situation, we see residential land rent gain 
around the stations and the centre with no fast mode connection. However, the immediate area 
around the employment centre with fast rail connection experience rent loss due to the decline in 
the wage-paying ability of the centre. Changes in any of the variables that affect the level of 
wage-paying ability of centres have an impact on the level of rent loss or gain that areas 
experience as a result of moving from one rail investment scheme to the other. (see Figure AII.1.)  
(c) Effects of mixed land market  
We can also allow a mixed land market for the two centres in the city and see what effect this has. 
The simulated result is given in Table AII.2 in the appendix II. Generally, as expected, the 
outcome is in between the out comes of the two uniform land market situations. In the unimodal 
and complete bimodal transport cases, alternating the land market situation between centres 
results in perfect symmetry. However, the partial bimodal transport case has some special 
features. Higher land rent receipts are achieved when the centre served by the railway has a 
competitive land market.    
7. CONCLUSION 
From the discussion above, we can conclude that each area of change on the model has a unique 
effect on the model equilibrium result. Due to possible transport cost saving, railway stations 
serve as centres which have an artificial wage and a corresponding residential land bid curve.  
Generally, investment in the fast mode results in: city growth both in terms of area size and 
population; increase in rent receipts; and denser residential settlements. However the effect of the 
investment for individual centres and their corresponding residential areas depends on the 
underlying land market assumptions and the level of investment. 
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As we progressively invest in railways from a unimodal to a complete bimodal situation, we 
observe rent losing and gaining phenomena, along segments of the city in the segmented land 
market situation. 
When land rents are captured as a source of investment for railway infrastructure, the increase in 
total rents is highest in the situation of a competitive land market. But it is important to realise 
that the rent increases are spread widely in the urban metropolitan area, which may make them 
difficult to collect in real-world situations. Of course the most focussed increases of rents take 
place near the railway stations. Of special importance is the finding that, in the case of segmented 
markets, the total commercial rent receipts are higher than with a competitive land market. Thus, 
as long as rent capturing is limited to commercial land use, the segmented land market is not as 
unfavourable as one might expect. The issue of distortions of land markets is important because 
these distortions may have decisive impacts on long-run changes in transport demand in response 
to changes in the transport system. The present paper shows how such distortions can be 
addressed in an appropriate way.  
Investment plans in a mixed land market situation for the complete bimodal cases result in 
symmetry. However, in the partial bimodal plan, connecting the centre under a competitive land 
market results in higher land market receipts. 
In the present paper, we have analysed the impact of a second transport mode on the dynamics of 
centres in a metropolitan area, under the assumption that the additional infrastructure may 
reinforce or weaken the existing commercial centres. However, transport investments may also 
have far reaching effects on spatial structure, since they may stimulate the emergence of new 
centres. This theme of the formation of new centres has not been addressed in the present paper. 
Instead, we have focussed explicitly on the demand for commercial land and the implications of 
distortions for the land market. Analysing the possible emergence of additional centres falls 
outside the scope of this model, but is certainly a promising extension. In order to achieve this 
aim, the model should be developed in the direction of a more explicit treatment of production 
processes and agglomeration economies. 
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Appendix I: graphical presentation of simulation result 
 
Figure AI.1 competitive market 
 
Figure AI.2 segmented market 
 
a)  Rent curves for the unimodal-bicentric city 
case without a cost advantage between centres: 
a competitive market situation 
 a) Rent curves for the unimodal-bicentric city 
case, without a cost advantage between centres: 
a segmented market situation 
 
   
b) Rent curves for the partial bimodal city case, 
without a cost advantage between centres: a 
competitive market situation 
 b) Rent curves for the partial bimodal city case, 
without a cost advantage between centres: a 
segmented market situation 
 
    
c) Rent curves for the complete bimodal city 
case, without a cost advantage between centres: 
a competitive market situation 
c) Rent curves for the fully improved bimodal 
city case, without a cost advantage between 
centres: a segmented market situation 
Appendix II: Numerical presentation of simulation output 
Table AII.1: Simulation output for both markets in the case of no cost advantage between centres 
 Exogenous Para. Endogenous Variable 
  
CASES 
  
  
  
Centre 
  
  
Fast 
mode 
Comm. 
Land 
Area 
 
Sq. miles 
  
Annual 
Wages 
 
$ 
Resid.  
Land 
 
 
Sq. miles 
  
Labour 
Supply 
Comm. 
land  
 
sq. miles 
Capital 
Land 
ratio 
Annual 
Resid. 
Rent 
at centre 
edge  
$/sq. ft. 
Annual 
Com. 
Rent 
at centre 
Edge  
$/sq. ft. 
Aver. 
Annual 
Resid. 
Rent 
 
$/sq. ft. 
Aver. 
Annual 
Com. 
Rent 
 
$/sq. ft. 
Annual 
Floor 
space 
rent 
 
$/sq. ft. 
Total 
Resid. 
Rent 
 
 
Bill. $ 
Total 
Com 
Rent 
 
 
Bill. $ 
Total 
Rent 
 
 
 
Bill. $ 
Unimodal                 
1 
 
no     20,000  52.17  250,000  1.95 1.20 2.51 2.51 1.30 2.51 9.48 1.893 0.136 2.029 Competitive market 
 
 2 
 
no     20,000  52.17  250,000  1.95 1.20 2.51 2.51 1.30 2.51 9.48 1.893 0.136 2.029 
 
Total/ 
average 
 
    104.34 500,000 3.90       1.30 2.51   3.786 0.273 4.058 
1 
 
no 1.80   19,947  52.02  248,751  1.80 1.32 2.50 2.77 1.30 2.77 9.70 1.879 0.139 2.018 Segmented market 
 
 2 
 
no 1.80   19,947  52.02  248,751  1.80 1.32 2.50 2.77 1.30 2.77 9.70 1.879 0.139 2.018 
  
Total/ 
average 
 
    104.04  497,502  3.60       1.30 2.77   3.758 0.277 4.035 
Partial bimodal                 
1 
 
yes     20,000  58.60  290,195  2.26 1.20 2.51 2.51 1.38 2.51 9.48 2.252 0.158 2.410  Competitive market 
 
 2 
 
no     20,000  50.03  237,352  1.85 1.20 2.51 2.51 1.28 2.51 9.48 1.786 0.129 1.916 
 
Total/ 
average 
 
    108.63  527,547  4.11       1.34 2.51   4.038 0.288 4.326 
1 
 
yes 1.80   19,846  57.97  285,107  1.80 1.58 2.47 3.30 1.36 3.30 10.10 2.196 0.166 2.361  Segmented market 
 
 2 
 
no 1.80   19,979  50.16  238,003  1.80 1.25 2.51 2.61 1.28 2.61 9.57 1.791 0.131 1.922 
 
Total/ 
average 
 
    108.13  523,110  3.60       1.34 2.99   3.986 0.297 4.283 
 Complete bimodal                             
1 
 
yes     20,000  56.46  275,860  2.15 1.20 2.51 2.51 1.36 2.51 9.48 2.135 0.151 2.287  Competitive market 
 
 2 
 
yes     20,000  56.46  275,860  2.15 1.20 2.51 2.51 1.36 2.51 9.48 2.135 0.151 2.287 
 
Total/ 
average 
 
    112.92  551,720  4.30       1.36 2.51   4.271 0.302 4.573 
1 
 
yes 1.80   19,876  56.10  273,894  1.80 1.50 2.48 3.14 1.34 3.14 9.98 2.100 0.157 2.257  Segmented market 
 
 2 
 
yes 1.80   19,876  56.10  273,894  1.80 1.50 2.48 3.14 1.34 3.14 9.98 2.100 0.157 2.257 
 
Total/ 
average 
 
    112.21  547,788  3.60       1.34 3.14   4.199 0.314 4.514 
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Table AII.2: Simulation output for both the three transport cases with mixed land markets between the centres. 
 Exogenous Para. Endogenous Variables 
CASES 
  
  
  
Centre 
 
 
 
 
 
Fast 
mode 
Comm. 
Land 
Area 
 
Sq. miles 
  
Annual 
Wage 
 
$ 
Resid.  
Land 
 
 
Sq. miles 
  
Labour 
Supply 
Comm. 
land  
 
sq. miles 
Capital 
Land 
Ratio 
Annual 
Resid. 
Rent 
at centre 
edge  
$/sq. ft. 
Annual 
Com. 
Rent 
at centre 
Edge  
$/sq. ft. 
Aver. 
Annual 
Resid. 
Rent 
 
$/sq. ft. 
Aver. 
Annual 
Com. 
Rent 
 
$/sq. ft. 
Annual 
Floor space 
rent 
 
$/sq. ft. 
Total 
Resid. 
Rent 
 
 
Bill. $ 
Total 
Com 
Rent 
 
 
Bill. $ 
Total 
Rent 
 
 
 
Bill. $ 
Unimodal                 
Competitive market 1 
 
no  
      
20,000        52.17  
      
250,002  
        
1.95  
        
1.20          2.51          2.51  
        
1.30          2.51         9.48  
          
1.893  
          
0.136  
          
2.029  
Segmented market 2 
 
no 1.80 
      
19,947        52.02  
      
248,751  
        
1.80  
        
1.32          2.50          2.77  
        
1.31          2.77         9.70  
          
1.879  
          
0.139  
          
2.018  
 
Total/ 
average 
 
      104.19  
      
498,753  
        
3.75     
        
1.31          2.64  
          
3.772  
          
0.275  
          
4.047  
Segmented market 1 
 
no 1.80 
      
19,947        52.02  
      
248,752  
        
1.80  
        
1.32          2.50          2.77  
        
1.30          2.77         9.70  
          
1.879  
          
0.139  
          
2.018  
Competitive market 2 
 
no  
      
20,000        52.17  
      
250,001  
        
1.95  
        
1.20          2.51          2.51  
        
1.29          2.51         9.48  
          
1.893  
          
0.136  
          
2.029  
 
Total/ 
average 
 
      104.19  
      
498,753  
        
3.75     
        
1.30          2.64  
          
3.772  
          
0.275  
          
4.047  
Partial bimodal                 
Competitive market 1 
 
yes  
      
20,000        58.63  
      
290,350  
        
2.26  
        
1.20          2.51          2.51  
        
1.38          2.51         9.48  
          
2.253  
          
0.158  
          
2.412  
Segmented market 2 
 
no 1.80 
      
19,982        49.95  
      
236,792  
        
1.80  
        
1.24          2.51          2.60  
        
1.28          2.60         9.56  
          
1.780  
          
0.130  
          
1.910  
 
Total/ 
average 
 
      108.58   527,142  
        
4.06     
        
1.33          2.55  
          
4.034  
          
0.288  
          
4.322  
Segmented market 1 
 
yes 1.80 
      
19,846        57.94  
      
284,938  
        
1.80  
        
1.58          2.47          3.30  
        
1.36          3.30       10.10  
          
2.194  
          
0.165  
          
2.360  
Competitive market 2 
 
no  
      
20,000        50.25  
      
238,674  
        
1.86  
        
1.20          2.51          2.51  
        
1.29          2.51         9.48  
          
1.798  
          
0.130  
          
1.928  
 
Total/ 
average 
 
      108.19   523,612  
        
3.66     
        
1.33          2.90  
          
3.992  
          
0.296  
          
4.287  
Complete bimodal                  
Competitive market 1 
 
yes  
      
20,000        56.46  
      
276,985  
        
2.16  
        
1.20          2.51          2.51  
        
1.34          2.51         9.48  
          
2.249  
          
0.151  
          
2.400  
Segmented market  2 
 
yes 1.80 
      
19,876        56.10  
      
273,985  
        
1.80  
        
1.50          2.48          3.14  
        
1.35          3.14         9.98  
          
1.985  
          
0.157  
          
2.142  
 
Total/ 
average 
 
      112.56   550,970 
        
3.96     
        
1.34          2.80  
          
4.234  
          
0.308  
          
4.542  
Segmented market 1 
 
yes 1.80 
      
19,876        56.10  
      
273,985  
        
1.80  
        
1.50          2.48          3.14  
        
1.35          3.14         9.98  
          
1.985  
          
0.157  
          
2.142  
Competitive Market 2 
 
yes  
      
20,000        56.46  
      
276,985  
        
2.16  
        
1.20          2.51          2.51  
        
1.34          2.51         9.48  
          
2.249  
          
0.151  
          
2.400  
 
Total/ 
average 
 
      112.56   550,970  
        
3.96     
        
1.34          2.80  
          
4.234  
          
0.308  
          
4.542  
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     Residential rent curve: unimodal case. 
    Residential rent curve: partial bimodal case. 
    Residential rent curve: complete bimodal case. 
    
Figure AII.1 Residential land rent along the linear city for the three categories
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